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INTRODUCTION
A significant question lurks in the background of this symposium: What is
public interest lawyering? It is far beyond the purview of this essay to attempt a
comprehensive definition of what constitutes public interest legal practice.
Instead, like any good common law lawyer, I plan to reason by analogy.
Specifically, I will highlight a few ways in which the work that copyright and
trademark lawyers do is often analogous to the kind of work done by lawyers who
are engaged in practices that are fairly uncontroversially accepted as public interest
lawyering.
I begin in Part I by examining how copyright and trademark law are each
animated by fundamental goals of furthering the public interest and noting that, to
the extent that one views current law as falling short of achieving those goals, that
provides an opportunity for public interest lawyering in the form of advocating for
* © 2012 R. Anthony Reese, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. My
thanks to Christopher Leslie for organizing the symposium and inviting me to participate, and to my
fellow participants for helpful discussions on the topic.
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legal reform. Part II then considers the opportunities that practicing copyright and
trademark lawyers have for engaging in the paradigmatic form of public interest
lawyering: representing clients who cannot afford legal representation. I offer
examples of such public interest copyright and trademark lawyering in
representing both clients who need to defend themselves against claims of
copyright and trademark infringement and clients who have their own copyright
or trademark claims that they need to assert. Part III turns to the potential role for
copyright and trademark law in public interest lawyering directed at economic
empowerment for disadvantaged individuals and communities. Finally, Part IV
explains how copyright and trademark law, perhaps more than many other areas
of business law, are often intertwined with freedom of expression concerns, and
thus in some instances representing a client in a copyright or trademark case may
help achieve the same goals as familiar public interest lawyering, which often seeks
to defend freedom of speech.
I. THE PUBLIC INTEREST PURPOSES OF TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW
In some ways, it seems strange to ask whether copyright law and trademark
law are relevant to public interest lawyering, given that each body of law has a core
purpose to advance the public interest in a particular way.
Some may think of trademark law as merely regulating relationships among
the producers of goods and services and protecting certain rights of one producer
against infringement by competitors. Indeed, trademark law certainly offers
producers who use marks in connection with their products a valuable tool against
some uses by competitors of identical or similar marks. But the core goal of
traditional trademark law has long been to prevent ordinary consumers from being
confused or deceived.1 In a sense, trademark law is a very venerable branch of
consumer protection law. While trademark infringement suits are brought by one
trademark user against another, the basic object of traditional trademark
infringement litigation is really vindicating consumer sovereignty. For example, if a
consumer chooses to purchase a particular company’s product, then trademark
law seeks to ensure that she receives that product, and not one from some other
producer that she has been led to mistakenly believe is actually the product she
wants to buy. In other words, if the consumer wants to buy BEN & JERRY’S ice
cream, then she should not inadvertently end up with BEN & JERKY’S products
instead. Trademark law’s consumer protection rationale seeks to ensure that the
consumer can relatively easily make her purchasing choices in the marketplace.2

1. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (“Infringement law
protects consumers from being misled by the use of infringing marks and also protects producers
from unfair practices by an ‘imitating competitor.’”).
2. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, reduce[s] the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a
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And trademark infringement law can help facilitate other consumer
protection goals as well. For example, if trademark law ensures that the consumer
actually gets the brand of product that she thinks she is getting when she makes
her purchase, then the consumer also will be able to pursue the right party—the
actual producer of her chosen brand—if, for example, the product turns out not
to be satisfactory. She might pursue her dissatisfaction by complaining to the
producer, demanding a refund, posting a negative review online, or deciding to
shift her future purchases to other producers, but in each instance trademark law
can help ensure that her actions are directed at the party who actually supplied the
disappointing product.
Like trademark law, copyright law also has at its core a goal to serve the
public interest. Many may perceive copyright law as concerned primarily with the
enrichment of copyright owners, which in many cases may be (or may be
perceived as) well-off corporations, such as movie studios and record companies.
But the fundamental purpose of copyright law, as expressed in the constitutional
provision that empowers Congress to enact copyright statutes, is to promote the
progress of “Science”—that is, of learning or knowledge.3 Copyright law aims to
do this by providing incentives for people to create works of authorship and then
to disseminate those works to the public. This public-regarding purpose can be
seen in the title of the very first U.S. copyright statute, passed by the first Congress
in 1790, which begins with the words “An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning.”4
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear the public interest purpose of
the private rights that the law grants to copyright owners. In 1932, the Court
wrote that the “primary object in conferring the [copyright] lie[s] in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”5 Sixteen years later, the
Court wrote that “[t]he copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration . . . [R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the
public of the products of his creative genius.”6 And again in 1975, the Court spoke
of copyright law’s goal as one of benefitting the public:
[Copyright law] reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. . . . [T]he ultimate aim

potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other
similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
3. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 n.11.2 (2012).
4. 1 Stat. 124, 1st Cong. (1790). The first British copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, had a
nearly identical title. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
5. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (emphasis added).
6. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (emphasis added).
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[of copyright law] is . . . to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.7
Thus, while copyright law operates by granting potentially valuable rights to
private parties (such as authors and publishers), the foundational understanding of
copyright law is that Congress grants those rights because it has concluded that,
on balance, those grants will lead to greater production and dissemination of
knowledge and culture, for the benefit of the public at large, than would result if it
did not grant such rights.
For both copyright and trademark law, we can, of course, question to what
extent the current legal regime effectively implements these core public interest
purposes and to what extent the law on the books and on the ground has strayed
from them. For example, the cause of action for trademark dilution, recognized in
the federal statute only in 1996,8 allows an owner of a famous trademark to stop
another person from using a similar mark even in the absence of any likelihood
that the use will confuse or deceive any consumers,9 and this body of trademark
law seems harder to justify on the consumer protection grounds that undergird
traditional trademark infringement law.10 And many people believe that the scope
and duration of rights granted to copyright owners by current copyright law go
beyond what is needed to provide authors and distributors with sufficient
incentives to create and disseminate works of authorship.11
Of course, in many areas of law that are understood to promote the public
interest, one can question how well the existing law on the books, or on the
ground, actually achieves those public interest goals. And any gap between the
law’s public interest goals and its actual effects provides the opportunity for
copyright and trademark lawyers to engage in activity that seems generally
understood to constitute public interest lawyering: advocacy for legal reform. To
the extent that the current legal regime does not serve the expressed public
interest goals of copyright law or trademark law, that means that public interest
lawyers have work to do advocating to reform existing law so that it better
achieves the goals of protecting consumers and promoting the diffusion of

7. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
8. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
Approximately twenty-five states had adopted some form of dilution protection between 1947 (when
Massachusetts adopted the first state antidilution statute) and 1995. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3
(1995).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:69 (4th ed. 2012).
10. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (“Unlike traditional
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law
development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 9, § 24:72 (“Antidilution law has a strong resemblance, not to the law of consumer protection,
but to the law of trespass on property.”).
11. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001).

UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/14/2012 5:35 PM

COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW

915

knowledge. To the extent that any proposed revision to the current regime would
not serve the law’s expressed public interest goals, public interest lawyers still have
work to do objecting to—and seeking to revise and improve—such proposals.
Such advocacy for legal reform is well recognized as a type of public interest
lawyering in other areas, and recent years have seen an increase in public interest
groups doing such work in the fields of copyright and trademark law, including
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, the Center for Democracy
and Technology, and others. Whether or not one agrees with their positions in any
particular instance, these organizations are practicing public interest lawyering in
their advocacy for or against proposals to amend the copyright and trademark
statutes.
II. REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS UNABLE TO AFFORD LEGAL COUNSEL
Perhaps the archetypal form of public interest lawyering is providing legal
representation to clients who would otherwise be unable to afford effective legal
counsel. Trademark and copyright law offer many opportunities for public interest
lawyers to represent such clients. In this Part, I look at representing both indigent
clients accused of infringing someone’s copyright or trademark and clients who
have copyright or trademark infringement claims of their own but cannot afford
an attorney to assert them. I also note that representing under-resourced nonprofit
organizations, as some public interest lawyers do, may sometimes involve assisting
those organizations with trademark matters.
A. Representing Clients Accused of Trademark or Copyright Infringement
Indigent clients may find themselves sued for alleged trademark or copyright
infringement. Such defendants may well have winning arguments as to why their
conduct does not violate a plaintiff’s trademark or copyright rights and
meritorious defenses against such infringement claims.
Authors and artists are themselves sometimes subjected to overreaching
copyright claims by another copyright owner. For example, James Joyce’s
grandson told Carol Shloss, a respected literary scholar who was writing a critical
biography of Joyce’s daughter Lucia, that Shloss could not quote Joyce’s or Lucia’s
writings in her work, and could not quote information from Lucia’s medical
records or letters written to her by third parties.12 In fact, Shloss’s quotations from
the copyrighted writings of James and Lucia Joyce may well have constituted fair
use (and the copyright statute expressly provides that fair use does not infringe
copyright),13 the facts contained in medical records are not subject to copyright

12. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Shloss v.
Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 06-3718), 2006 WL 3619866.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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protection,14 and James Joyce’s estate owned no copyright in letters written by
other people to Lucia Joyce.15
As another example, consider photographer Thomas Forsythe, who took a
series of seventy-eight photographs called “Food Chain Barbie,”16 which the court
described as follows:
Forsythe generally depicts one or more nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with
vintage kitchen appliances. For example, ‘‘Malted Barbie’’ features a nude
Barbie placed on a vintage Hamilton Beach malt machine. ‘‘Fondue a la
Barbie’’ depicts Barbie heads in a fondue pot. ‘‘Barbie Enchiladas’’
depicts four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas and covered with salsa in a
casserole dish in a lit oven.17
While Mattel claimed (among other things) that Forsythe’s photographs
infringed on the company’s copyright in the Barbie doll, Forsythe believed that his
work was “obviously ‘fair use’—political and social criticism presented with
humor and parody,”18 and would therefore not infringe Mattel’s copyrights.
Somewhat similar situations can arise involving trademarks, when an existing
mark holder sues (or threatens suit) alleging that a smaller business, or sometimes
a new market entrant, is infringing its mark. Consider Bo Muller-Moore, who runs
a small t-shirt printing business in Montpelier, Vermont. For several years, one of
his most popular t-shirts has featured the hand-stenciled slogan “Eat More Kale,”
as depicted here:

14. Copyright offers no protection to facts (though it can protect an original expression of
facts). See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350
(1991); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir.1990).
15. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.2.1.3 (3d ed. 2012). Lucia Joyce
(or her estate) would only own the copyright in a letter written and sent to her by another person if
the letter’s author expressly transferred the copyright to her.
16. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
17. Id.
18. Tom Forsythe, Food Chain Barbie and the Fight for Free Speech, ARTSURDIST, http://www.tom
forsythe.com/the-fight-for-free-speech.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
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This design, however, has earned him repeated trademark trouble with the fastfood chain Chick-fil-A, which has several trademark registrations for the slogan
“EAT MOR CHIKIN,”19 which it uses as part of its advertising campaign
featuring semi-literate Holstein cows trying to save their hides by persuading
customers to eat chicken instead of beef. In 2006, Chick-fil-A sent Muller-Moore
a letter alleging trademark infringement and demanding that he stop selling his
EAT MORE KALE t-shirts, though when the company took no further action,
he continued to sell the shirts. When Muller-Moore applied in 2011 to register his
own trademark in the “EAT MORE KALE” slogan for t-shirts and related
goods,20 Chick-fil-A protested and demanded that he cease using the slogan and
turn over his domain name, eatmorekale.com. The dispute is ongoing, leaving the
parties’ factual and legal disagreements unresolved. However, it is not clear that
Muller-Moore’s use of EAT MORE KALE is likely to cause any consumer
confusion. If it is not, then his use of the slogan is not infringing, and he would
not be barred from registering his mark on the grounds that it is confusingly
similar to Chick-fil-A’s.21
As these examples illustrate, artists and small entrepreneurs may face
overreaching claims by copyright or trademark owners of violating the owners’
intellectual property rights. The artist or entrepreneur in these instances may well
have winning arguments for why her conduct is not infringing. Many aspects of
copyright and trademark law are fact-intensive and case specific, including
whether a defendant’s trademark is likely to cause confusion with a plaintiff’s
trademark, whether a defendant’s work of authorship is sufficiently similar to a
plaintiff’s copyrighted work to infringe,22 and whether a defendant’s copying of a
plaintiff’s copyrighted work constitutes noninfringing fair use.23
But the costs of defending against such suits can be substantial, often
running to hundreds of thousands of dollars.24 Given the expense of litigating

19. See EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration No. 2,010,233; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration
No. 2,062,809; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration No. 2,240,326; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration
No. 2,197,973; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration No. 2,538,050; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration
No. 2,538,070.
20. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,412,053 (filed Aug. 31, 2011).
21. Even if Muller-Moore’s mark is not confusingly similar to Chick-fil-A’s, he still might not
be able to register the mark if Chick-fil-A’s mark is famous (and thus entitled to trademark law’s antidilution protections) and his mark would dilute Chick-fil-A’s mark. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1063(a)
(2006).
22. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 9.3.1 (“[T]he [copyright infringement] plaintiff must show
that audiences will perceive substantial similarities between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s
protected expression.”).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
24. A survey of members of the American Intellectual Property Law Association indicated
that in 2011, the all-inclusive median cost for litigating a trademark or copyright infringement suit
with less than $1 million at risk was $350,000. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011).
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these cases, typically in federal court,25 an artist or entrepreneur who is sued for
copyright or trademark infringement may not have the resources to assert
potentially successful defenses against the plaintiff’s claims, particularly if she faces
an opponent with substantially greater resources, such as the James Joyce estate,
Mattel, or Chick-fil-A. For this reason, the defendant may have little choice but to
accede to the plaintiff’s demands and stop using parts of the plaintiff’s work or
stop using the entrepreneur’s allegedly confusing trademark. As a result, free or
low-cost legal representation may be key to enabling an artist or entrepreneur who
is sued to vindicate the legality of her activities and continue them. Public interest
lawyers who will represent poorly resourced defendants in copyright and
trademark disputes can thus enable an artist or author to create her works, or
allow a small business to continue to operate under the name its customers know.
Indeed, the examples given in this section come from cases in which public
interest groups, law firms acting pro bono, or a combination of the two
represented the alleged infringers, demonstrating the importance of public interest
lawyering in determining whether copyright or trademark claims asserted against
under-resourced defendants are valid.26 While Muller-Moore’s trademark dispute
with Chick-fil-A is currently ongoing, courts in the copyright examples above
ultimately determined that Shloss and Forsythe were not infringing copyrights in
James Joyce’s works or Mattel’s Barbie, and those authors were able to continue
disseminating their works.
B. Representing Clients Asserting Trademark and Copyright Infringement Claims
Another opportunity for public interest lawyering in copyright and
trademark law comes not from defending clients against claims of infringement,
but from representing them in asserting their own infringement claims. As noted
above, copyright and trademark claims can be very expensive to litigate. Even if a
low-income plaintiff has a strong infringement claim, the available monetary
damages might not justify pursuing the claim, given the litigation costs. For
example, a freelance photographer who finds one of her photographs used
without permission in a national magazine might have relatively small actual
damages—the license fee that she would have charged the magazine for
permission to use the photo,27 which might have cost, for example, only $500,
$1000, or $2000. If the photographer must litigate a copyright infringement claim
in federal court in order to recover those damages, the cost of the litigation is
25. Copyright claims can only be heard in federal court, and many trademark claims are
brought there although they can also be brought in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
26. Shloss was represented by the Stanford Law School Cyberlaw Clinic and attorneys from
Kecker & Van Nest and from Howard Rice. Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1083 (N.D.
Cal. 2007). Forsythe was represented by attorneys from Howard Rice, acting on behalf of the ACLU
of Southern California. See Forsythe, supra note 18. Muller-Moore is being represented pro bono. Jess
Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, but T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, at A12.
27. Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001).
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likely to dwarf the recovery. (Indeed, even the cost of the lawyer’s time needed to
send a demand letter and settle the claim without litigation, if the magazine were
willing to do so, might exceed the likely amount of recovery.) As a result, those
authors and business operators who cannot easily afford legal representation may
be unlikely to pursue their potentially valid claims against infringers. In such cases,
those authors and business operators do not receive any compensation for the
harm they have suffered. To make matters worse, if the low-income rightsholder
cannot afford to pursue litigation, she will also not receive injunctive relief against
any harm she continues to suffer. This is likely to be a particular problem in cases
of trademark infringement, since it may mean that consumers will continue to be
subjected to ongoing confusion; indeed, injunctive relief was traditionally the
preferred remedy in trademark infringement cases precisely in order to prevent
such ongoing confusion.28
Copyright and trademark law already attempt to address these difficulties for
poorly resourced rightsholders, but they do so only imperfectly.29 Copyright law
provides statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages, so that a copyright
owner may recover in the ordinary case between $750 and $30,000 per work
infringed.30 But statutory damages are only available if the infringed work was
registered with the Copyright Office before the infringement began.31 Of course, a
low-income copyright owner may well be unable to afford to systematically
register her works as they are produced, and she will thus be unlikely to be able to
recover statutory damages. Even if statutory damages are available, the amount of
the damage award within the statutory range is to be set “as the court considers
just,” leaving a potential plaintiff (and her potential counsel) uncertain as to how
large an award she might be able to receive if she wins.
The Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, also
contain provisions allowing a court to award a prevailing party her attorney’s
fees,32 which could offer some encouragement for a struggling artist or business
28. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (noting that an
accounting of an infringer’s profits will be “denied where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the
case”); Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1994)
(describing injunction as “the preferred Lanham Act remedy”); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 30:31.
29. The Copyright Office is currently conducting a study “to assess whether and, if so, how
the current legal system hinders or prevents copyright owners from pursuing copyright infringement
claims that have a relatively small economic value (‘small copyright claims’); and recommend potential
changes in administrative, regulatory, and statutory authority to improve the adjudication of these
small copyright claims.” Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,758 (Oct. 27, 2011);
see also 77 Fed. Reg. 51,068 (Aug. 23, 2012).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2006). The statute also provides that if the infringement was
willful, the maximum amount of statutory damages rises from $30,000 to $150,000, while if the
infringement was innocent, the minimum amount falls to $200.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006) (the only caveat to this rule applies in cases where “registration is
made within three months after the first publication of the work,” even if such registration occurs
after an infringement action has commenced”).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
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owner to bring an infringement claim in the hope that, if the claim succeeds, the
plaintiff will recover not only her damages but also the cost of hiring counsel to
bring the suit. Such recovery, though, is by no means assured. The Copyright Act
gives courts the discretion to award an attorney’s fee but does not require them to
do so,33 and in any event conditions an award of attorney’s fees on registration
prior to infringement (as it does for statutory damages).34 The Lanham Act allows
an attorney’s fee award only “in exceptional cases.”35 As a result, a plaintiff who
expends the resources to bring an infringement suit in the hope of not only
winning and recovering her actual damages (or a higher amount in statutory
damages), but also having the infringer ordered to pay her attorney’s fees, is taking
a substantial risk. Contingent fee arrangements might help address this problem,
but these do not seem to be common in copyright and trademark litigation.
All of this means that a financially struggling author who finds her copyright
infringed may well go uncompensated for the monetary damages that the
infringement caused her if she cannot get free or reduced-cost legal
representation. Likewise, a struggling small business owner who finds her
trademark being infringed but cannot afford a lawyer may end up not being
compensated for any damages she has suffered and may not be able to enjoin a
third party’s continuing infringing use of her trademark and the continued harm
that use causes to her business by confusing consumers. Representing authors and
business owners who have valid infringement claims but who cannot afford paid
counsel thus presents another opportunity for a classic type of public interest
lawyering in the copyright and trademark fields.
C. Representing Nonprofit Organizations
One particular type of client that often can ill afford to pay for counsel is the
nonprofit organization. An entity’s nonprofit status does not in itself indicate that
the organization cannot afford to pay for legal representation—extremely well-off
foundations and private universities may be nonprofit organizations but can
certainly pay lawyers to represent them. Many other nonprofit organizations,
though, struggle with very limited resources to achieve their organizational goals
and may well be unable to afford legal representation at market rates. Pro bono
lawyering has long involved handling issues—including corporate formation and
tax exemption—for such entities.
Trademark law also offers opportunities to practice public interest lawyering
by representing under-resourced nonprofit organizations, as such organizations
may find themselves on one side or another of a trademark dispute.36 Consider,
33. 17 U.S.C. § 505.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
36. Nonprofit organizations may face copyright issues as well, but trademark claims seem
more likely to arise across a wider variety of fields of activity that nonprofit organizations may
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for example, the Maya Archaeology Initiative (MAI), a nonprofit organization that
aims to “provide the means to protect and improve northern Guatemala through
a range of diverse programs,”37 and that uses the following logo:

In 2011, cereal maker Kellogg’s asserted that MAI was infringing on the “Toucan
Sam” character the company uses to promote its Froot Loops cereal, as seen on a
recent box:38

engage in. See Trademark Registration for NPOs, NONPROFIT CENTRAL, http://www.startnonprofit
organization.com/trademark-registration-for-npos (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“Patents and
copyrights may not be relevant for most of the nonprofit organizations. Many nonprofit
organizations instead go for trademark or service mark registration.”).
37. Our Mission, MAYA ARCHAEOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://mayaarchaeology.org/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=83&Itemid=203. (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
38. Kellogg in Fight over Toucan Sam Logo, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 23, 2011, at A11.
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The company threatened to sue MAI if the group did not alter its logo and
agree to conditions on its future use.39 The parties eventually settled the dispute
on terms favorable to MAI without litigation,40 but the episode offers an example
of the kind of trademark claim that a nonprofit organization might have to defend
against.
Nonprofit organizations may also need representation to assert trademark
claims of their own. For example, The Committee for Idaho’s High Desert
(CIHD), a nonprofit environmental advocacy organization founded in the late
1970s, unknowingly let its state corporate charter lapse in the mid-1980s.41 In the
early 1990s, individuals with views antithetical to those of CIHD discovered the
lapse, formed a new corporation with the same name, and engaged in advocacy of
positions opposed by CIHD. CIHD successfully sued the individuals and the new
corporation for trademark infringement, and eventually won an injunction against
the defendant’s continued use of the name “Committee for Idaho’s High Desert.”
These examples show that public interest lawyering can involve representing
nonprofit organizations that cannot afford counsel to assert or defend trademark
claims—indeed, CIHD was represented in its litigation by a public interest
group.42
III. ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
Providing legal assistance that helps economically disadvantaged individuals
and communities improve their economic situation is another example of legal
work that is commonly regarded as public interest lawyering. Indeed, UC Irvine’s
own Community Economic Development Clinic is an example of this type of
public interest lawyering.43
A. Copyright and Economic Empowerment
It can be easy to see copyright as a body of law that benefits economic
superstars—bestselling authors, recording artists who produce megahits, film
artists who create blockbusters that break previous box office records, etc. Many
observers fail to see that copyright law is also very important to many other less
prominent creators, who are usually much less economically successful than the
39. Id.
40. John Gallagher, Kellogg Toucan Trademark Dispute Resolved, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 16,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 23485907.
41. Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1996).
42. The Committee for Idaho’s High Desert was represented in the suit by the Land and
Water Fund of the Rockies. Id. at 816. That group has now changed its name to Western Resource
Advocates and describes itself as a “nonprofit environmental law and policy organization.” About Us,
W. RESOURCE ADVOCATES, http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/about (last visited Nov. 14,
2012).
43. See, e.g., Iris Yokoi, Legal Clinic Champions Local Small Businesses, UCI LAW (May 11, 2012),
http://www.law.uci.edu/communications/ced_feature_051112.html.
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superstars. These include, for example, the photographer who works as a
freelancer hoping to sell an image to a news outlet or who produces notecards and
other merchandise bearing her images; the technical writer who uses her skills on a
contract basis to produce copy for clients; the quilter who produces new designs
for quilts to sell to customers; the painter who paints canvases during evenings
and weekends and sells them online; and many others.
In other words, many authors and artists who are not copyright’s superstars
often struggle to make a living through their creative work. Copyright law offers
an essential part of the infrastructure that might allow them to do so. If the author
finds an audience for her work, then copyright law is designed to help ensure that
the rewards from that audience’s demand go to the author, and not to other
parties who simply make copies of the author’s work and sell them for less than
the author.44
As a result, a public interest lawyer who helps an under-resourced author
exploit her copyrights can assist the author in being able to earn a living from her
work. This might involve, as discussed in the previous Part, litigating against a
third party who is infringing on the client’s copyright. But it might also involve
advising a client regarding potential copyright transactions in order to help the
client make good economic and business decisions regarding her work and
livelihood. It is not uncommon to hear complaints by artists who feel that they
have entered into bad bargains with a distributor (publisher, record company, film
studio, retailer, etc.) and signed away their rights for a mess of pottage. Legal
representation for a struggling artist will not necessarily change any underlying
imbalance in bargaining power between an author and a distributor, but it may
nonetheless help the author to strike a deal that she finds more satisfactory by
providing her a better understanding of the legal consequences of the proposed
bargain. And even if an author decides to accept a monetary pittance from a
distributor in return for signing over her copyrights because she believes that
other benefits (such as public exposure) make the overall deal worthwhile, at least
she will have a better chance of striking that deal with her eyes open to the costs
and benefits involved.
B. Trademark and Economic Empowerment
Trademark law, too, can help support economic development since
trademark rights can be an important tool for entrepreneurs engaged in such
development. For example, an entrepreneur working in an economically
disadvantaged community may start a small business that contributes to the

44. Copiers can typically charge lower prices than original authors because they have not
borne any of the costs of creating a work and therefore do not need to charge a price that attempts to
recover that investment in creating the work. See generally R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private:
Copyright’s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 653–54 (2007).
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economic development of that community. The business may become successful
and acquire goodwill among customers in the community and beyond, and the
entrepreneur may be able to expand, potentially further enhancing the economic
opportunities in the community. Trademark law can allow the entrepreneur to
prevent others from free riding on the goodwill of her small business and from
undermining the success of the enterprise (and the amount it contributes to the
community’s economy), but many entrepreneurs may be unable to afford the legal
representation necessary to secure their trademark rights and prevent others from
infringing on them.
Again, as in the copyright context, public interest legal work here can take
the form of litigation against third parties who infringe on a client’s trademark
rights, but it can also involve nonlitigation matters as well. Indeed, a substantial
amount of trademark representation for under-resourced entrepreneurs might
involve prosecuting an application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to
obtain a registration of the client’s trademark.45 While trademark rights can arise
merely from the entrepreneur’s use of the mark in the course of her business
operations, federal registration can offer substantial advantages to the owner of
the mark’s registration, and many entrepreneurs might not be likely to enjoy those
advantages without legal representation to help them navigate the registration
process.46 Such representation seems quite similar to legal work that is generally
regarded as public interest lawyering: the lawyer assists the client in engaging in an
administrative proceeding before a government agency in order to convince the
agency to provide some government benefit to the client. Traditionally, this kind
of public interest representation might involve, for example, obtaining Social
Security benefits for the client; in this context, it would involve securing a
trademark registration.
Thus, in addition to providing legal assistance to clients who would
otherwise be unable to afford counsel to represent them in litigating copyright and
trademark matters, public interest lawyering on copyright and trademark matters
can take the form of legal representation that attempts to assist with the economic
empowerment of individuals and communities.
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Representing clients to vindicate their freedom of speech has traditionally
been regarded as a type of public interest lawyering, carried out by organizations
such as the ACLU. Copyright and trademark law are intertwined with free
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006) (governing registration of marks on the Principal
Register).
46. Such benefits include a nationwide right of priority to use the mark as of the date of the
application to register the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). Another benefit is a registration certificate,
which constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registrant’s mark and her exclusive right
to use the mark. Id. § 1057(b).
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expression issues more substantially than most types of business law.47
A copyright or trademark owner can go into federal court and get a court order
(under the provisions of a statute enacted by Congress) that bars a defendant from
engaging in certain expressive acts. This brief description alone highlights the
tension between copyright and trademark protection and the First Amendment’s
provision that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press.”48
A defendant accused of copyright or trademark infringement may be
engaged in using the plaintiff’s copyrighted work or trademark in the defendant’s
own speech. So a judgment that the defendant has infringed, and an injunction
against the defendant’s continued use of the plaintiff’s work or mark, may mean
that the defendant will have to stop engaging in her expression, or will have to
express herself in a different way. The same consequence will follow, even in the
absence of any court judgment that the defendant’s conduct is infringing, if the
defendant capitulates to the plaintiff rightsholder’s demands because litigation to
establish whether the defendant’s expressive activity is or is not infringing would
be too expensive.
Some examples can help illustrate the connections between copyright or
trademark law and free expression. A copyright example comes from the case of
Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc.49 In October 2007, Michael
Savage, host of the right-wing daily radio program The Savage Nation, made
statements about Islam and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
during his two-hour program that CAIR considered inflammatory.50 CAIR posted
on its website a detailed commentary on Savage’s remarks, including a fourminute-and-thirteen-second audio clip of excerpts from Savage’s program.51
Savage sued CAIR alleging that the posting of the audio clip infringed on his
copyright in the program, and CAIR defended against that claim by arguing that
its posting constituted fair use. The district court ultimately concluded that CAIR’s
use did constitute fair use as a matter of law and granted CAIR judgment on the

47. On the relationship between copyright and free expression concerns, see, for example,
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008),
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970), and Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1180 (1970). On the relationship between trademark and free expression, see, for example,
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), Int’l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics,
789 F.2d 1319, 1320–26 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), and Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark
Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2007).
48. U.S CONST. amend. I.
49. Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
50. Id. at 1732
51. Id. See National Radio Host Goes on Anti-Muslim Tirade, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC REL.
(Nov. 1, 2007, 11:40 AM), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?ArticleID=23608.
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pleadings as to Savage’s copyright infringement claim, so CAIR can continue to
allow visitors to its website to listen to the recording of Savage’s remarks in
conjunction with its commentary on them.52 Although the court decided in
CAIR’s favor purely on copyright grounds, it noted in its discussion of Savage’s
other claim against CAIR (a civil RICO claim) that Savage’s claimed injury “is
entirely founded upon defendants’ speech-related activities,”53 and that the First
Amendment would place significant hurdles in the way of Savage’s claim.54 Thus,
CAIR was engaged in classic free speech activity, but faced the possibility that
accusations of copyright infringement might force it to abandon or substantially
curtail that speech.55
Trademark claims can also implicate free expression concerns. One example
involves claims by MasterCard against Ralph Nader, alleging that a television
advertisement that Nader ran as part of his 2000 presidential campaign infringed
on MasterCard’s trademarks in what it called its “Priceless” advertisements, which
the court described:
These advertisements feature the names and images of several goods and
services purchased by individuals which, with voice overs and visual
displays, convey to the viewer the price of each of these items. At the end
of each of the Priceless Advertisements a phrase identifying some
priceless intangible that cannot be purchased (such as “a day where all
you have to do is breathe”) is followed by the words or voice over:
“Priceless. There are some things money can’t buy, for everything else
there’s MasterCard.”56
MasterCard alleged that the Nader campaign infringed on its trademarks57 by
running a pro-Nader commercial that the court described as follows:
That political ad included a sequential display of a series of items showing
the price of each (“grilled tenderloin for fund-raiser; $1,000 a plate;”
“campaign ads filled with half-truths: $10 million;” “promises to special
interest groups: over $100 billion”). The advertisement ends with a
phrase identifying a priceless intangible that cannot be purchased

52. Savage, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1738.
53. Id. at 1740.
54. Id. at 1739.
55. For another example, see Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203–05
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that an electronic voting machine company asserted an invalid copyright
infringement claim in attempt to suppress publication of employee e-mails acknowledging problems
associated with company’s machines).
56. MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1047–48
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
57. MasterCard had registered as trademarks for credit and debit card services the word
“PRICELESS” and the phrase “THERE ARE SOME THINGS MONEY CAN’T BUY. FOR
EVERYTHING ELSE THERE’S MASTERCARD.” Id. at 1048.
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(“finding out the truth: priceless. There are some things that money can’t
buy”).58
MasterCard demanded that Nader cease running the advertisement and
when Nader did not do so, MasterCard filed suit.59 Although the court denied
MasterCard a preliminary injunction during the 2000 campaign, it was not until
nearly four years after MasterCard’s suit was filed that the court granted the Nader
campaign summary judgment on all of MasterCard’s claims. A presidential
candidate’s advertisement communicating to voters the way in which the
candidate believes he is different from the other candidates in the race seems to be
a quintessential instance of the type of free expression that implicates core First
Amendment concerns. But claims of trademark infringement threatened to silence
that speech, though they were not ultimately successful in doing so.60
Here again, a defendant who is sued (or threatened with suit) for copyright
or trademark infringement may not have the resources to defend herself against
such a claim. But while the claims against such a defendant may be grounded in
copyright or trademark law, the claims have implications for freedom of speech as
well. If the defendant cannot afford to mount a defense, then she may simply
accede to the plaintiff’s demands and cease her allegedly infringing speech, or alter
it substantially in order to satisfy the plaintiff that it no longer infringes, even if
she may have meritorious arguments for why her speech is not infringing. If she
cannot afford to assert (or be prepared to assert) those claims in court and instead
capitulates to the plaintiff’s demands and abandons her expression, abandoning
her speech causes a loss to free expression values and to the people who might
have received her expressive message. If the defendant has meritorious arguments
for why her speech is not infringing, then that loss to free expression values does
not come with any corresponding public gain of any benefit of promoting the
progress of learning (in the case of speech alleged to infringe on a copyright) or of
reducing consumer confusion or deception (in the case of speech alleged to
infringe on a trademark), because the defendant’s use is not infringing and is not
within the scope of the exclusive rights granted to the plaintiff in order to achieve
the goals of copyright or trademark law. Instead, the law could allow the
defendant to continue to speak in the same way that she had been speaking—thus
vindicating our goal of protecting free expression—and could simultaneously
fulfill the goals of the copyright and trademark laws.
58. Id.
59. The suit alleged federal and state trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair
competition claims, as well as copyright claims. Id. at 1047.
60. Not all political advertisements that use a third party’s copyrighted work or have
similarities to a third-party’s trademark will constitute noninfringing use. For example, in Henley v.
DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2010), the court concluded that online videos posted
by Chuck DeVore’s U.S. Senate campaign that featured altered versions of Don Henley’s copyrighted
songs “The Boys of Summer” and “All She Wants to Do Is Dance” did not qualify as noninfringing
fair use, and therefore infringed on Henley’s copyrights.
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Without counsel to represent defendants in such cases—either by actually
taking the defendant’s arguments to court or by using them to resist demands
made by a rightsholder in cease-and-desist letters that threaten litigation—society
will simply lose the defendants’ speech and suffer a free-expression harm without
any counterbalancing copyright or trademark gain. Representing defendants who
could not otherwise afford to defend against infringement claims that might
improperly interfere with the defendants’ free expression thus offers an important
opportunity for public interest lawyering in the copyright and trademark fields.
Furthermore, because courts have generally resisted subjecting copyright and
trademark claims to formal First Amendment scrutiny,61 public interest lawyers
who work in this area will often need to argue these cases within the framework of
copyright or trademark law. Courts are far more likely, for example, to resolve
these cases in favor of a defendant on the ground that the defendant’s use
qualifies under copyright law as fair use, and therefore does not infringe on the
plaintiff’s copyright, than to determine that although the defendant’s use
constitutes copyright infringement under the current Copyright Act as applied,
that application of the Copyright Act is outside of Congress’s power because it
violates the First Amendment.62 That is, after all, how the court resolved Savage’s
copyright infringement claim against CAIR. Similarly, courts generally resolve
trademark infringement claims based on the standard “likelihood of confusion”
analysis, even when the defendant’s alleged use of the mark might seem to
constitute speech at the core of First Amendment protection, as the court did with
MasterCard’s claims against Nader.63
In many of these situations, defendants who face charges of infringement
will be unable to afford an attorney to represent them in expensive and potentially
protracted litigation. Indeed, the defendants in the examples given in this part
were represented by public interest organizations or private attorneys acting pro
bono.64 Here again, then, copyright and trademark cases present the opportunity
61. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193–94 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873,
876 (2012); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
62. See, e.g., Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730,
1737 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (resolving a copyright claim for the defendant on fair use, not First
Amendment, grounds); MasterCard, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1050–51 (resolving a trademark claim for the
defendant on grounds that the defendant’s use was not likely to confuse consumers, not on First
Amendment grounds).
63. MasterCard, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1050–51; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute
Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 263 (2007) (adapting the standard likelihood of confusion analysis
for the situation where the defendant’s use qualifies as parody). But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing whether the defendant’s use should be
allowed because of free speech interests after having concluded that use was likely to cause consumer
confusion under the standard analysis).
64. In Savage, CAIR was represented by the nonprofit Electronic Frontier Foundation as well
as an attorney from Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 2008 WL 2951281. Fish & Richardson represented
the Nader campaign pro bono. See Sheri Qualters, Charitable Protections: More Local Law Firms Offer IP
Expertise on a Pro Bono Basis, BOSTON BUS. J., Sept. 24, 2004, at 44, 51.
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for public interest lawyering quite similar to familiar public interest lawyering—
representing clients seeking to vindicate their rights to freedom of expression.
CONCLUSION
Copyright and trademark are bodies of substantive law that provide
opportunities for lawyers to practice law in ways that seem fairly commonly
understood as public interest lawyering. While some may see copyright and
trademark disputes as generally involving battles between well-to-do parties, such
disputes not only can, but often do, involve at least one party that may not be able
to afford legal representation. This means that public interest lawyers have
opportunities to represent indigent clients who likely would not otherwise have
their interests represented in the legal system. In addition, such representation can
sometimes serve to help foster economic development. And, because copyright
and trademark law are often closely intertwined with issues of freedom of speech,
representing clients in these matters often protects values of free expression,
allowing the client to continue to speak and the public to benefit from that speech.
All of these types of copyright and trademark practice can fit well within
conventional understandings of what constitutes public interest lawyering.

